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Abstract
The 1970 Clean Air Act divided responsibility for achievement of air quality standards between the EPA and
states. It is widely believed that, as a result, state-regulated sources received taller stacks, but analysis suggests that
this is not true.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Background
1.1. The division between federal and state
The Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1970 established National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQSs) and assigned responsibility for achieving them. In particular, responsibility for stationary
sources was divided between the federal government, through the Environmental Protection Agency
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(EPA), and the states. The EPAwas authorized to establish uniform emissions standards for new sources
called new source performance standards (NSPS) while states were given the responsibility for
controlling emissions from existing sources to achieve compliance with NAAQSs (Portney, 2000).
States, under pressure to meet NAAQS, would likely seek low cost means of doing so. One
inexpensive option for reducing ambient pollution levels is to dilute/export pollution through increased
stack heights.1 Taller smokestacks can improve local air quality without reducing total emissions. Prior to
dissemination of information about control options (scrubbing, etc.) and the possible regional or global
effects of emissions, it was believed that local air quality problems could be effectively addressed through
taller stacks. Even if there was knowledge of pollution-removing devices, there were clear cost
advantages to building up. Ackerman and Hassler (1981) estimate that in 1975, the cost of building a tall
smokestack was 3% to 17% of the cost of popular pollution control equipment. As such, it would not be
surprising if stack heights increased as a result of the CAAA.
1.2. The widely believed effect of state versus federal regulation
It is widely believed that one effect of the CAAA's division of responsibility between states and the
federal government was that states offered the electric generation plants they regulated incentives to build
taller smokestacks. This is particularly true for coal-fired boilers that tend to produce relatively high levels
of four NAAQS pollutants. The goal of encouraging taller stacks was to send emissions high into the
atmosphere to be more widely dispersed, perhaps beyond the state's borders, improving the emitting
state's air quality. Federally regulated boilers, on the other hand, faced no such incentives, as federal
regulators would find no advantage in interstate transport of emissions. The widely believed end result is
that state-regulated boilers received taller stacks than did federally regulated boilers; specifically due to
the incentives of the NAAQS. While examples of this belief are common, including Tietenberg (2004),
Kahn (2005) and Ellerman et al. (2000), no previous empirical evidence has been presented. This paper
presents empirical results testing the proposition that state-regulated boilers had taller stacks built for them
than did federally regulated boilers.
1.3. History and rules about stacks and exporting pollution
This paper investigates the relationship between environmental regulation and stack heights, but this
requires some explanation of the relevant regulations.
Environmental regulations are generally applied to boilers within plants. Stacks are associated with a
particular type of regulation only through their associated boiler or boilers. Boilers built before 1971 are subject
to relatively lax state regulation and present opportunities for reduction of local pollution concentrations
through the construction of newer, taller stacks. Boilers built after 1971 are subject to strict federal regulation.
The federal government should be less inclined to push stacks higher to improve local air quality if the pollution
will simply wind up somewhere else.
1 “… a stack is defined as a tall, vertical structure containing one or more flues used to discharge products of combustion to the
atmosphere…. a flue is defined as an enclosed passageway within a stack for directing products of combustion to the
atmosphere.” EIA (2002), p. iii.
214 A.S. Bellas, I. Lange / Economics Letters 98 (2008) 213–219
A U.S. Court of Appeals ruling in 1983 restricted the use of tall stacks to meet pollution regulations
(UPI, 1983).2 This is somewhat surprising in that the federal government reviewed state implementation
plans and would seem likely to reject those depending on increased stack heights and export of emissions.
In addition, Section 110 of the CAAA of 1970 (EPA, 1970) actually contains language that would seem to
deter or prevent large-scale exportation of pollution. However, Portney (2000) and the National
Commission on Air Quality (1981) suggest that in practice this language has proven inadequate. Part of
the reason for this inadequacy may be related to language in the Act restricting a locality's ability to call
for an interstate conference to resolve transboundary pollution problems if an ambient air quality standard
exists for that pollutant, as is the case for most power plant emissions. Section 123 of the current version
of the CAAA (EPA, 1990) addresses stack heights to some extent, saying:
“The degree of emission limitation required for control of any air pollutant… shall not be affected in
any manner by so much of the stack height of any source as exceeds good engineering practice… or
any other dispersion technique.”
According to the Buonicore and Davis (1992), good engineering practice for a stack height is equal to
2.5 times the height of the nearest building. This language is echoed in numerous state pollution plans.
However, Section 123 goes on to say, “In no event may the Administrator prohibit any increase in any
stack height or restrict in any manner the stack height of any source.”
Our goal is to test whether states intended to comply with the CAAA by exporting their emissions
through taller stacks at units they regulated. The expectation is that from 1971 to the mid-1980s stacks
built for state-regulated boilers will be taller than those built for federally regulated boilers. To be clear,
it is the difference in regulation that might drive the difference in stack heights. This analysis will be
conducted for boilers fueled by coal and for two cleaner fuels, petroleum and gas, for comparison.
2. Data
Data are taken from the Energy Information Administration's Form 767 from 1996, which collects
information on design, operation and regulation of boilers, stacks and pollution control units at U.S.
steam-electric plants (EIA, 1996, 2002).
Graphical analysis of mean stack heights, presented in Fig. 1, suggests that new stacks increased in
height from the 1950s to the 1980s. The data include the dates that both the boiler and stack came on line
and the type of regulation to which the boiler is subject. The unit of analysis is the stack itself rather than
the associated boiler and the dependent variable is the stack height in feet. The explanatory variables are: a
state regulation dummy, the stack's in-service year, the capacity of the boiler (in thousand pounds of
steam per hour), the stack exit velocity3, a dummy variable indicating whether the unit was subject to
local SO2 standards that were more stringent than federal or state standards, a dummy variable indicating
the plant is located in a county that borders another state, a dummy variable indicating the plant is located
in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), dummy variables indicating the presence of a flue gas
desulfurization (FGD) pollution control unit, a flue gas particulate (FGP) control unit and equipment for
reduction of nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions, the sulfur (SO2) emissions limit to which the plant was
subject and regional dummy variables. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
2 “Agency Must Rethink Rules on Smokestacks”, New York Times, October 12, 1983.
3 Plants can have a higher “effective stack height” if the emissions leave the stack at a higher velocity.
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If states were using tall stacks to export pollution then the state regulation and border county dummy
should have a positive effect on stack height. The presence of any type of pollution control equipment or
strict local regulation or a strict SO2 emissions limit should be associated with shorter stacks, as they
would result in cleaner emissions that need not be exported.
3. Analysis and results
The analysis presented here is based on observations from the years 1971 through 1986. The cut-off of
1986 is chosen as this is when construction of new plants and/or stacks slowed considerably and it
Fig. 1. Mean height of new stacks by year, in feet.
Table 1
Summary statistics, 1971–1986
All stacks Gas stacks Petrol stacks Coal stacks
n 481 92 47 342
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Height (ft) 484.16 230.59 203.40 96.63 412.57 151.71 569.53 199.92
State 0.57 0.50 0.79 0.41 0.79 0.41 0.49 0.50
Stack year 1976.90 4.11 1973.91 2.33 1974.98 2.78 1977.97 4.15
Capacity 4215.36 3766.76 2606.27 2092.95 4457.43 3421.82 4614.95 4044.36
Velocity 80.23 28.11 69.26 35.81 80.96 26.28 82.95 25.38
Local 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.14
FGD 0.21 0.40 0.29 0.45
FGP 0.78 0.41 0.07 0.25 0.62 0.49 1.00 0.00
NOx 0.24 0.43 0.07 0.25 0.02 0.15 0.32 0.47
SO2 3.96 4.05 3.97 4.06
Border 0.49 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.79 0.41 0.50 0.50
MSA 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.47 0.94 0.25 0.39 0.49
West 0.46 0.50 0.78 0.41 0.09 0.28 0.42 0.49
Northeast 0.10 0.30 0.01 0.10 0.62 0.49 0.05 0.22
Southeast 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.43 0.21 0.41
Midwest 0.24 0.43 0.04 0.21 0.06 0.25 0.32 0.47
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provides for a lag in the U.S. Appeals court decision discussed above. The analysis was performed for
three types of fuel, listed in order of their emissions potential: coal, oil, and natural gas. The following
linear regression model was estimated.
Heighti ¼ b0 þ b1Statei þ b2Yeari þ b3Capacityi þ b4Velocityi þ b5Localþ b6FGDi
þ b7FGPi þ b8NOxi þ b9Sulfuri þ b10Border þ b11MSAþ b12Regionþ ei ð1Þ
Table 2
Regression results by fuel type, 1971–86
Dependent variable: stack height
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gas Oil Coal Coal
State −22.62 −75.68 43.24 150.07
(22.05) (81.94) (33.36) (48.07)⁎⁎⁎
Year 11.46 9.31 1.78 1.54
(3.96)⁎⁎ (12.96) (3.51) (3.46)
Capacity 0.023 0.018 0.013 0.035
(0.004)⁎⁎⁎ (0.007)⁎⁎ (0.003)⁎⁎⁎ (0.008)⁎⁎⁎
State×capacity −0.025
(0.008)⁎⁎⁎
Velocity 0.19 0.10 0.71 0.75
(0.25) (1.22) (0.44) (0.43)⁎
Local 79.18 −100.67 −111.08 −100.47
(34.40)⁎⁎ (129.02) (89.86) (88.42)
FGD 20.42 23.36
(31.20) (30.70)
FGP 43.37 43.49
(33.93)⁎ (48.90)
NOx −15.25 −72.31 −4.73 −4.15
(34.82) (148.76) (28.61) (28.14)
SO2 −2.16 −1.87
(2.87) (2.82)
Border 11.82 57.33 33.17 30.86
(18.03) (59.71) (22.79) (22.42)
MSA −35.23 152.89 −65.66 −63.28
(17.18)⁎⁎ (87.42)⁎ (24.05)⁎⁎⁎ (23.66)⁎⁎⁎
West −141.56 −59.47 −196.80 −180.70
(80.59)⁎ (95.81) (56.27)⁎⁎⁎ (56.50)⁎⁎⁎
Southeast −69.85 −37.65 47.54 54.36
(85.53) (56.23) (57.95) (57.01)
Midwest −151.83 −75.01 −113.53 −98.00
(85.16)⁎ (97.37) (56.32)⁎⁎ (55.61)⁎
Constant 252.92 144.61 549.52 439.46
(94.94)⁎⁎ (190.28) (79.11)⁎⁎⁎ (85.79)⁎⁎⁎
Observations 86 47 252 252
R-squared 0.58 0.46 0.36 0.39
Standard errors in parentheses. ⁎ significant at 10%; ⁎⁎ significant at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ significant at 1%.
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where Heighti is the height of stack i in feet, the explanatory variables are as described above and εi is a
stochastic error term4. A second specification adds a cross term relating state regulation and capacity for
coal-fired boilers.
The results, presented in Table 2, suggest that state-regulated stacks were not significantly taller than
federally regulated stacks. The positive (though insignificant for coal and oil) coefficients on year are
consistent with a gradual upward trend in stack heights. Total capacity of the associated boiler had a
positive and significant effect on stack height, suggesting that larger boilers had taller stacks built for
them. Estimated coefficients on the regional dummies suggest that stacks in the northeast (the excluded
category in this analysis) are consistently taller than stacks elsewhere in the country.
Looking solely at coal-fired power plants, there is no statistically significant height difference between
state-regulated and federally regulated units. Stacks located in MSAs were statistically significantly
shorter by about 10%. The estimated coefficients on emissions control variables (FGD, FGP, NOx, and
SO2 emissions limits) were statistically insignificant.
5 These results imply variables that reduce the
incentive to build a tall stack, have no significant impact on stack height. These results suggest that states
were not able to export pollution through tall stack heights.
When the interaction term relating state regulation and capacity is added to the model for coal-fired
boilers, the results change. The estimated coefficient on the state regulation dummy becomes positive and
significant, but this is offset by the negative coefficient on the interaction term. This means that for a coal-
fired boiler of median capacity, a state-regulated stack is predicted to be 54.5 ft, or about 10%, taller than a
federally regulated stack. These results are surprising because larger boilers, with potentially greater
emissions, have shorter predicted stack heights if state-regulated than they would have if federally
regulated. This suggests that states did not have the ability to differentially push stacks higher to export
emissions, even among the dirtiest units that they regulated.
4. Discussion
It is widely believed that in the 1970s, states responded to the air quality standards imposed by the
CAAA by encouraging the construction of taller stacks at the coal-fired plants they regulated. The goal of
this policy was to either disperse or transport pollutants from relatively dirty coal-fired plants and achieve
improvements in state air quality at the lowest possible cost. However, the results presented here are
inconsistent with this story. We find that the level of government at which a boiler was regulated had no
significant impact on the height of a new stack built for it during this period and that states seem to have
been incapable of forcing stacks higher to export emissions.
As we move into an era of several new attempts to deal with air quality issues (Clean Air Interstate
Rule, Mercury Rule) by transferring authority to states, these results are instructive. It seems that concerns
about states addressing air quality issues by transporting emissions elsewhere are not strongly supported
by the data for the period we examine. States' ability to export emissions may have been checked by EPA
regulators whose focus was more regional than conventional wisdom suggests or by the fact that the EPA
had to approve state pollution plans. If these results can be generalized, a localized approach to pollution
regulation may not carry with it the problem of intentional interstate export of emissions and air quality
4 Only coal-fired boilers had an FGD device or an SO2 emissions limit.
5 Attempts to identify a differential effect of FGD units on heights of state and federally regulated stacks yielded no significant
difference. Results available on request.
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problems. While interstate transport of emissions is certainly a potential problem, at least in the case of the
early years of the CAAA, states don't seem to have intentionally made the problem worse in an attempt to
clean their own air. If states were unable to freely export pollution in the early years of the CAAA, it seems
unlikely that they will be able to in the future given our greater understanding of pollution transportation.
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